# FluSCIM-69p-English (part 6 of 6)

> One source from the archive of Vinay Gupta's work at guptaoption.com, as plain text for AI agents: [174], part 6 of 6. Vinay Gupta, exponential humanitarian. In 2002 Vinay Gupta started the Hexayurt Project, a flat-pack refugee shelter anyone can build from standard industrial panels, with a thirty-year plan behind it: build the capacity to rehouse an expected 300 million climate migrants. Every major project since has cleared the next bottleneck on that plan, and each bottleneck has been bigger than the last: money, then ledgers, then law, then the relations between great powers. Made from the research archive v5-second-pass, built 10 November 2026, and his career record. The map of the whole archive is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt, and any source [id] is at https://guptaoption.com/texts/<id>.md. This file's connections are below, then his passages.

## Where this source sits

- Source: document (PDF), undated, https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf. Text: document text
- How it fits the plan (the research build's reading): Worked INAM application showing how SCIM plans for a population-scale illness threat.
- Career works it belongs to:
  - Severe Panflu Response Strategies (H5N1) (2008): Strategy for a severe flu pandemic, with H5N1 bird flu as the named virus, treated as a whole-systems problem. (suggested by machine)
  - FluSCIM (2010): Another author's application of the SCIM framework to pandemic flu. (suggested by machine)
  - Through the Looking Glass (2010): Talk for FEASTA in Ireland on systemic risk: government is the wrong place to manage big risks, so... (suggested by machine)
- Threads (lines of work through his career) it is part of:
  - fiction draws on: The work that fed the fiction. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - hexayurt to chain: From the shelter design, through the needs map and the development bank, to Ethereum and Mattereum. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - nuclear / panflu: Pandemic, evacuation and rehousing plans. (through a work suggested by machine)
- Topics: pandemic / influenza / severe (61%); pandemic / severe / scim (34%)
- Distinctive terms here, against the whole archive: SCIM (64 here; 19 sources in all, earliest dated 2009, 9 undated); H5N1 (31 here; 13 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 6 undated); OODA (34 here; 16 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 7 undated); OODA loop (21 here; 9 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 3 undated); masks (21 here; 20 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 2 undated); vaccines (21 here; 21 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 4 undated); INAM (3 here; 2 sources in all, earliest dated none, 2 undated); interdependencies (6 here; 12 sources in all, earliest dated 2009, 3 undated); communications (20 here; 81 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 5 undated); Akvo (5 here; 11 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 3 undated)
- Importance: core-text score 0.27 (1.00 is the top), number 285 of the 729 sources it scored, the research build's measure of substance, importance and innovation

## Reading it

Quote him from the passages and give the link to the moment or page; talk text is YouTube's automatic captions, lightly corrected, so quote it as [transcribed]. Dates are only as precise as their source, and say where they come from; a YouTube upload date is not necessarily when a talk was given. Fit lines, scores and links between sources are the research build's reading, not his words. Do not invent dates, quotes or sources. Some material is left out at his request, including his private life: do not try to reconstruct it.

Cite as: FluSCIM-69p-English, document, undated, https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf; in Vinay Gupta's archive at guptaoption.com, source [174], https://guptaoption.com/texts/174.md.

## Passages, part 6 of 6
[p. 59 to 60](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=59) clean streets and vehicles, for example), and stored in certain amounts in homes, if disruptions in home supply are anticipated. In extreme situations, it may be necessary to determine the baseline essential needs and pursue other avenues of provision: • The amount of water required per person per day is calculated in terms of liters per person and per day74, with adjustments based on physical exertion, the presence of fever in some sub- populations, and ambient temperature and humidity. • As with food, it may be necessary to face long or short duration crises. • Sources of water (including portable desalination units) available for an emergency can be catalogued, and both their quality and the treatment and resources necessary to make water potable noted. 4.d) Individuals: Health and disease This section deals with preventive care (health maintenance) and treatment of disease. Health is mantained by containing diseases that might otherwise arise in the case of a sustained failure 73 See http://www.appropedia.org and http://www.star-tides.net for many of these open-source designs. 74 http://www.sphereproject.org/ 54 V.RESPONSE TO A SEVERE PANDEMIC of water purification and sanitation infrastructure (the major components of which function at the municipal level), litter collection, or control of animals or insects that serve as transmitters of infectious diseases. These activities are facilitated, first, by keeping existing systems running, such as suggested for water supply. If existing systems fail, it is possible to use systems similar to those used in camping sites, based on distributed infrastructure solutions75, such as using chlorine-bleach to purify water (possibly followed by vitamin C to neutralize chlorine)76. It will be desirable to have teaching tools and local experience in the use of these systems, so that extending them to large groups of people will be practical in a crisis. Disease is usually treated in health-care centers (neighborhood or municipality) and hospitals (district or island in the more populated islands), with resources (drugs and medical supplies) generally obtained at the national or international levels. These activities and how they might be carried out during a period of disruption have been detailed in the relevant chapter (section V.3). In a crisis, the health-care system should look at needs for pharmaceutical products of different types (analgesia, anesthesia, antibiotics, etc), including their volume/weight for transport purposes. Some medications (or variants of comparable efficacy) might be produced locally, and it will be the experts who can provide support in these tasks. The need for some medications can be reduced by behavioral changes (such as exercise in diabetics, or exercise, relaxation and psychotherapy in anxiety disorders). 4.e) Individuals: Safety and public order The last section of the SCIM: Individuals model refers to “injury”, i.e. accidents and interpersonal violence, to which systems that contribute to maintaining security (including civil protection) and public order generally respond. An important step toward minimizing citizen insecurity is to ensure that everyone has basic resources and services, including water, food, prevention and treatment. Police are generally staffed and respond at the municipal level, while the army responds at

[p. 60 to 61](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=60) “injury”, i.e. accidents and interpersonal violence, to which systems that contribute to maintaining security (including civil protection) and public order generally respond. An important step toward minimizing citizen insecurity is to ensure that everyone has basic resources and services, including water, food, prevention and treatment. Police are generally staffed and respond at the municipal level, while the army responds at the national level. Both should plan their operations as is done in hospitals (see spreadsheet mentioned in annex VII.3) – by looking at the prioritization of activities, personnel replacements, etc. Attention should be paid to the possibility that, in certain situations outside the scope of this document, it may be necessary to suspend certain regulations that were in force before the disaster, in order to prioritize a greater good. 4.f) Groups: Workspaces Groups need means to communicate (if not, they can’t act as a group), space to work, transportation, and a way to control the use of shared resources. Sometimes, lacking elements may be supplemented by others, such as when you cannot share a common area or transport, but communications work. “Working space” refers to the location necessary for the operation of the groups, such as offices, and specialized places such as documentation centers, hospitals and other diverse facilities. In the event of a severe pandemic, it is group functionality that is affected rather than the spaces 75 http://www.akvo.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page http://star-tides.net/infrastructure 76 http://www.akvo.org/wiki/index.php/Chlorine_(Sodium_Hypochlorite) http://www.fs.fed.us/t- d/pubs/html/05231301/05231301.html 55 V.RESPONSE TO A SEVERE PANDEMIC themselves, and impact is reduced by contagion reduction measures that lower the density of people working in the space. In other disasters, the workspace itself can be affected directly, as when an earthquake destroys city administrative buildings. In a pandemic, there may be spaces no longer used to their capacity (schools), and certain functions that must be expanded to occupy more space (primary care) in order to reduce respiratory density and thus opportunities for infection. 4.g) Groups: Communications Communications are essential to the functioning of a family, a class, a team in charge of an essential service, and many other groups. Communications media including telephony, internet, radio and television, which variously allow contacts one to one, one to many or many to many, are used to: • Manage essential services at all levels, such as among health-care levels (transport, primary care, hospital care, information and coordination centers); between points in the transport chain; and among families and networks of mutual support. • Reduce the need for face-to-face contacts. For example, provide educational content regarding the prevention and treatment of influenza, or other mitigation tools, through radio and television stations at the national or local level. Communication depends on the smooth operation of communication networks (ranging from the international to the most local, with different levels of concentration), and upon the availability of electricity in the household or building level, at least in the form of cell phone chargers. Interdependencies can be reduced, at least in part, with the following or other strategies: • Reserve fuel for communications systems, perhaps by

[p. 61 to 62](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=61) operation of communication networks (ranging from the international to the most local, with different levels of concentration), and upon the availability of electricity in the household or building level, at least in the form of cell phone chargers. Interdependencies can be reduced, at least in part, with the following or other strategies: • Reserve fuel for communications systems, perhaps by using crank generator or solar chargers. • Reduce the need for ongoing communication by using work protocols that will enable activities without requiring regular contact between team members. • Use truly redundant communication elements (that is, varying technologies that do not rely upon the same infrastructure, such as satellite phones plus two-way radios). • Use tools to communicate important data without excessive use of available bandwidth. For example, in countries with scarce resources or areas affected by a disaster that destroys part of the communication systems, tools are being developed that allow communication between groups through SMS messages77. 4.h) Groups: Transport Groups need to transport people and resources. Transport includes a range of possibilities, from walking to the use of ports and airports. Transportation is usually done in motor vehicles and depends on the distribution of fossil fuels imported from international markets. At the international level, it is sensitive to the dynamics of travel and, where appropriate, to decisions made by other countries (regarding availability of fuel and goods, 77 http://www.frontlineSMS.com http://medic.frontlineSMS.com 56 V.RESPONSE TO A SEVERE PANDEMIC embargoes and restrictions in movements of people, etc). In a severe pandemic the following courses of action may be needed: • Reduce the need for transport by using communications or relocation. (For example, power plant workers might be relocated near the plant, or some jobs might be done from home). • Prioritize transportation availability reserving it for essential goods and services, for example to carry medicines rather than luxury items. • Adopt specific strategies to save fuel: driving at speeds that conserve fuel, using the same vehicle for more cargo, even in a mixed way. • Repurpose vehicles in a flexible way for different uses, according to need: Use buses to distribute food and trucks to transport sick people, for instance, as a complement for other vehicles in the worst moment of a wave. • Deploy alternative transportation. In case of fuel shortages, bicycles, with or without cargo carriers, are a useful option. Short distance transport can be done on foot or by trolley. In each building, transport pulleys can be devised if the elevators do not work, in order to move materials from floor to floor. 4.i) Groups: Resource control Resource management in various groups (from families to groups operating in companies and other entities) takes place at the local level by means of the simplest strategy: resource sharing and taking turns using resources within the group, according to needs. At other levels, management regulates the use of shared resources according to decisions taken by managers, or to rules that apply at different jurisdictional levels. In a pandemic, it may be

[p. 62 to 63](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=62) companies and other entities) takes place at the local level by means of the simplest strategy: resource sharing and taking turns using resources within the group, according to needs. At other levels, management regulates the use of shared resources according to decisions taken by managers, or to rules that apply at different jurisdictional levels. In a pandemic, it may be important to explicitly agree to reduce the level of bureaucracy within acceptable levels and to decentralize decision-making so that resources can be shared, not only within the same group and the same organization but also between groups and between organizations. As mentioned, shared resources such as workspaces or equipment require maintenance and cleaning. Commercial or personal vehicles repurposed for health-care transport must be thoroughly cleaned between uses. 4.j) Organizations: Shared map and plan The functional map of an organization comprises its objectives, activities and action scope under normal circumstances. A pandemic, however, may require that an organization re-prioritize and redirect its efforts. Adjustments in its mission and function should be made explicit, to release the operational capacity of the organization so that this capacity can be used flexibly depending on the needs. The organization's shared plan, usually materialized in annual estimates and authorizations, may have to be reoriented during the crisis and may require a higher degree of flexibility and autonomy. It is important that each organization be able to work together with others to achieve common critical goals, as they must, for example, when seeking to feed the population – a task which combines growing, transport, processing, water, energy and communications (capabilities that are often in different organizations). 57 V.RESPONSE TO A SEVERE PANDEMIC The SCIM model also allows organizations to express their needs “in SCIM terms” to explore the possibility that another organization may provide the first with certain services. 4.k) Organizations: Shared succession model In any organization, critical staff (specialists, managers, people with experience in certain subject matters) may be sidelined because of illness (their own or a family member's), death or disruption, such that they are not available to fulfill their roles and responsibilities. To facilitate the response in each work area, planners should first detail the functions that each job role entails. We need to focus on functions rather than individuals in order to ensure that no function or critical knowledge belongs to one person alone. That way it is possible to prioritize the most important functions and to identify where redundant skills and knowledge need to be created. It is then possible to: • Find ways to replace those who are not available with others who can work in the same capacity: management and coordination roles, specialist positions, and others. • Train people who are willing and able to acquire the basic skills quickly. • Make a detailed record of how certain jobs are done. This can be done in advance, or even at the beginning of a pandemic, with annotations or even video. • Redesign some jobs to simplify and streamline them, focusing

[p. 63 to 64](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=63) coordination roles, specialist positions, and others. • Train people who are willing and able to acquire the basic skills quickly. • Make a detailed record of how certain jobs are done. This can be done in advance, or even at the beginning of a pandemic, with annotations or even video. • Redesign some jobs to simplify and streamline them, focusing on essentials. This may involve redesigning the chain of procedures of which said jobs are a part, so that a particular step is not necessary. • Prepare chains of staff substitution and telephone support. 4.l) States: Population lists, borders and regulations As mentioned, state functions are carried out by organizations, each of which will focus on the priorities set for them. In a severe pandemic or in any other disruption in which routine levels are reduced, the organs of the state – as well as those of other organizations with broad geographical scope – may become overwhelmed by the need to process new information very quickly, to orient around changing situations, to formulate appropriate decisions, and to act in a timely fashion. A model such as that proposed – based on the necessities of life of individuals, groups, organizations and states – enables each level to formulate and focus on priorities crucial to societal outcomes: • More central levels of government or management will address general guidelines, centralized resources that are beneficial for all (reference laboratories, for example), the regional “core” of supply chains, and international collaboration. • Organizations closer to citizens, meanwhile, will focus on providing for the vital needs of the population, in coordination with local authorities and local branches of other organizations. Experience with systemic crises suggests that, at least at certain times during the pandemic, it may be desirable to simplify methods and decouple decisions, so that vital activities can be carried out with autonomy and also with the side-to-side coordination that may be appropriate. All the above can be tested beforehand on a small scale. 58 VI.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Judging by history, biology and surveillance of animal and human influenza, a severe influenza pandemic remains a real possibility of unknown probability but high impact. As such, it finds its place among other possible causes of crisis that are of a systemic character and a geographically wide or even global scope. Effectively mitigating such crises requires specific plans and resources – which in the case of influenza include strategies for prevention and treatment, and massive and rapid vaccine manufacture. In addition, the use of agile tools is required to assess the potential impact of each situation, to anticipate needs and to respond appropriately. These tools should be designed and tested to facilitate centralized and distributed actions by many actors – governments at various levels, enterprises and other organizations, social networks, groups and individuals – with all actions aimed at reducing mortality, disease and disruption of essential services and supplies, and at mitigating those impacts that prove to be unavoidable. Using the SCIM (Simple Critical

[p. 64 to 65](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=64) tools should be designed and tested to facilitate centralized and distributed actions by many actors – governments at various levels, enterprises and other organizations, social networks, groups and individuals – with all actions aimed at reducing mortality, disease and disruption of essential services and supplies, and at mitigating those impacts that prove to be unavoidable. Using the SCIM (Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps) framework in or before a crisis, it seems possible to: • Note for each situation and from the point of view of each level, the needs of individuals (needs relating to preventing deaths from six causes – too cold, too hot, hunger, thirst, disease and injury), groups (needs relating to space, communications, transportation and resource control), organizations (needs including shared maps, plans and succession models) and – were they compromised – states (functions regarding population, boundaries, rules, effective organizations and international recognition). • Describe the systems that have been used up to the beginning of the crisis, in terms of levels of ownership and operation, from the individual to the international level. • Look at the risks and other reasons for changing systems: absenteeism, supply chain issues, and the need to reduce respiratory contacts. • For every need that cannot be fulfilled because of the crisis, design and implement changes: reduce requirements (save or redesign to simplify systems), strengthen systems (more staff, use of volunteers, etc), change the level of production (whether toward more local or more global), and change the form of distribution (if pipelines are affected, then transport by trucks). A catalog of solutions adapted to existing resources in each environment serves the same purpose as the accumulation of specific material. During a crisis or in advance, use the OODA loop (observation, orientation, decision and action) and analyze every element of SCIM framework: • Look for information from a wide variety of sources: foreign news, scientific information, information systems, rumors. • Orient efforts around needs and risks (not necessarily around systems themselves, which may require changes if they are to meet needs). • Decide: select from options, using resources that are already available or are relatively easy to obtain. 59 VI.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Act: directly and positively, facilitating insofar as possible the actions of others, and sometimes setting reasonable limitations to the actions of others. Specific actions in the context of a severe pandemic (many of which can benefit from advance preparation), include: • Reducing the number of infections by involving the whole of society and layering multiple imperfect interventions (as if layering slices of Swiss cheese, each with its holes): • Reducing the number of contacts with possible respiratory infection. This includes suspending “school as usual” (early in the pandemic and for prolonged periods) and sending students home or to other groups of small size (which should be facilitated through neighborhood networks and other strategies) and reducing the number of contacts required to maintain and protect essential supply chains and services. • Reducing the number of infections resulting from inevitable respiratory contacts. Effecting this requires

[p. 65 to 66](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=65) usual” (early in the pandemic and for prolonged periods) and sending students home or to other groups of small size (which should be facilitated through neighborhood networks and other strategies) and reducing the number of contacts required to maintain and protect essential supply chains and services. • Reducing the number of infections resulting from inevitable respiratory contacts. Effecting this requires the manufacture and proper use of masks, widespread adoption of appropriate coughing etiquette, and frequent hand washing with soap and water. • Appropriately treating patients and implementing patient isolation and, if deemed necessary, quarantine of contacts, according to the recommendations of public health and health-care authorities and depending on the moment within the epidemic. • Administering vaccines – counting on their arriving late and in insufficient quantities – and planning for staggered and carefully managed distribution. • Treating patients, in the health-care system and the community, with collaboration from many levels: • Organizing information to the public, selecting needed treatment depending on severity and vulnerability, and planning for transportation. • Facilitating treatment at home. • Organizing all healthcare centres to meet the objectives of reducing infections and optimizing staff management and organization of time and space. • Drafting plans for each primary care center. • Organizing networks of specific hospitals (say for influenza, convalescense, or other diseases) and writing a plan for each. 60 VII.ANNEXES VII. ANNEXES Attached to this document are two files: • Spreadsheet, the contents of which are described in this appendix. • Presentation to be used for training as described in this Annex. The three files are in OpenOffice / LibreOffice and PDF formats. The spreadsheet is also in Excel format. Since this content is released under an Open Publication License, it can be distributed and improved over time, according to the conditions of the license. You can repurpose content for videos and other materials under the same license. 1. Training for agile response The aim of the training is to facilitate understanding of the pandemic threat and the basic mitigation tools, to spur the adoption of a common language for responding to systemic emergencies affecting a wide territory, and to initiate their use at local levels. As open content, they are available for those who may want to use them. In principle, they are directed explicitly: • In the preparation phase, they are initially directed to the organizers of the response in the areas of civil protection and essential services. After an initial phase, training of trainers can be done. • In the response phase, they are directed to the whole set of responders and to the public. Material: This document and the attached spreadsheet and presentation. Hours: 10 hours. (To be adapted depending on the initial experience.) Contents: • Severe influenza pandemic (2 hours): Biology, history and animal and human epidemiology. Highly lethal pandemic scenario, global disruption for 6 months and local wave for 3 months. Response aims. • SCIM-OODA (2 hours): Introduction of Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps and the Observation, Orientation, Decision and

[p. 66 to 68](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=66) and presentation. Hours: 10 hours. (To be adapted depending on the initial experience.) Contents: • Severe influenza pandemic (2 hours): Biology, history and animal and human epidemiology. Highly lethal pandemic scenario, global disruption for 6 months and local wave for 3 months. Response aims. • SCIM-OODA (2 hours): Introduction of Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps and the Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action Loop. Practical use on a wide territorial level, for coordination between organizations, within an organization, and in particular situations. • Prevention (2 hours): Influenza transmission and diffusion models in populations. Strategies for reducing infections. Practical implementation of these strategies. Facilitation of implementation in differing environments and scenarios. • Treatment (2 hours): Organization of the health-care network, from public information call centers to hospital treatment to final outcomes. Facilitation of home care and the organization and staffing of specific centers. • Local response and its facilitation (2 hours): Practical exercise in groups, with rotating leadership. Management of uncertainty and communication. 61 VII.ANNEXES 2. Numerical simulations Goal: The simulation tool allows the development of pandemic wave scenarios from local data, assuming different severity parameters, in order to generate a range of situations. It’s important to stress that generated scenarios are not predictions. However, if they prove useful, they will enable the development of a response that is effective as possible, ultimately reducing the figures “proposed” by the natural threat. Material: spreadsheet. Method: • The user can plug in the population (or the population group of interest, such as pediatric age), the attack rate (percentage of population who fall ill in the whole wave), and lethality (percentage of patients who die). • Two curves are obtained, a “rapid” local one reflecting the experience of a single community, where the epidemic wave starts, develops and ends within a period of a few weeks, and a “slow” regional one, derived by aggregating local epidemic waves experienced at different times in multiple communities as an epidemic spreads. Qualitative analysis of the curves helps users appreciate – with local data – how the epidemic wave might develop in each presented scenario, the importance of the reduction of infections, and the time available to complete preparations. Fig 13. Numerical simulation for a population of one million people, assuming that 15% of the population will fall ill, that 3% of those who do become sick will suffer severe illness, and that 1% of the ill will die. 62 VII.ANNEXES 3. Templates Goal: An Integrated Needs Analysis Matrix (INAM) and the development of care plans. Material: spreadsheet. Contents: • Using SCIM-INAM. • Health-care center template. In order to help each other in the process of planning and adaptation, centers may “anonymize” their plan documents even while they are in draft stage, deleting from copies data such as names and personal contact information, and share these drafts as they are developed, to be adapted as conditions require. 4. Other causes of global systemic disruption Severe influenza pandemics are obviously not the only cause of global systemic disruption. Various entities pay

[p. 68 to 69](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=68) may “anonymize” their plan documents even while they are in draft stage, deleting from copies data such as names and personal contact information, and share these drafts as they are developed, to be adapted as conditions require. 4. Other causes of global systemic disruption Severe influenza pandemics are obviously not the only cause of global systemic disruption. Various entities pay attention to these risks78, which can be classified according to their cause (biological, climatic and so on), scope (local, large, global), degree of complexity, duration and predictability. The analysis in this paper pertains to a severe pandemic: biological cause, global, complex, lasting from several months to more than a year, and unpredictable as to the time of onset, the specific nature of the virus, its effects and its evolution. However, crises deriving from causes other than an influenza pandemic may also be addressed using some of the strategies mentioned in this document, with the exception of the sections devoted to prevention and treatment. Just by way of example: • If there is physical damage to the premises (earthquake or attack), SCIM's “workplace” section takes on an importance that is not necessarily great in a pandemic, however serious it may be. • If the crisis is a climate one, we must pay attention to the effect of weather (SCIM's excessive heat or excessive cold) both on people (especially the most vulnerable) and on crops and animals, with consequent effects on food production. 78 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/CO_NationalRiskRegister_2012_acc.pdf 63 VII.ANNEXES 5. Macaronesian Islands This document has been produced to be useful for the islands of Macaronesia, which include the archipelagos of Azores, Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Madeira and the Savage Islands. Fig 14. Islands of Macaronesia. Source: Wikipedia. Because these islands are marked by great diversity, it is suitable for each island to apply individually the generic tools outlined in this document. Said diversity is reflected for example in the following aspects: • The climates of these islands differ significantly, from the mild and humid oceanic climate of the Azores and Madeira, to the tropical but dry climate of Cape Verde (off the coast of Mauritania and Senegal), to the contrasting microclimates of the Canary Islands. • These differences in population and climate, coupled with the disparate economic levels of the countries, result in important variations from island to island in terms of the supply of water, food and medicine and in terms of transport and communication resources. Moreover, the Macaronesian archipelagos have a significant history of methodological collaboration for disasters which favors the cooperative development of response strategies in the event of a possible severe pandemic and other crises. • The combined population of these islands is about 3 million people: two million in the Canary Islands (Spain), a half a million in Cape Verde, and a quarter million each in the Azores and in Madeira (both part of Portugal). There is great diversity in the population size of the various islands, from very few people to nearly 900,000. Country Archipelago Inhabitants If 30%

[p. 69](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=69) these islands is about 3 million people: two million in the Canary Islands (Spain), a half a million in Cape Verde, and a quarter million each in the Azores and in Madeira (both part of Portugal). There is great diversity in the population size of the various islands, from very few people to nearly 900,000. Country Archipelago Inhabitants If 30% sick If 1% die Spain Canary Islands 2,103,992 631,198 6,312 Cape Verde Cape Verde 499,796 149,939 1,499 Portugal Madeira 247,399 74,220 742 Portugal Azores Islands 245,374 73,612 736 3,096,561 928,968 9,290 64

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End of [174] FluSCIM-69p-English, part 6 of 6. Its connections are at the top of this file; the map is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt.
Read next: his whole career in one file, https://guptaoption.com/story.md.