# FluSCIM-69p-English (part 3 of 6)

> One source from the archive of Vinay Gupta's work at guptaoption.com, as plain text for AI agents: [174], part 3 of 6. Vinay Gupta, exponential humanitarian. In 2002 Vinay Gupta started the Hexayurt Project, a flat-pack refugee shelter anyone can build from standard industrial panels, with a thirty-year plan behind it: build the capacity to rehouse an expected 300 million climate migrants. Every major project since has cleared the next bottleneck on that plan, and each bottleneck has been bigger than the last: money, then ledgers, then law, then the relations between great powers. Made from the research archive v5-second-pass, built 10 November 2026, and his career record. The map of the whole archive is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt, and any source [id] is at https://guptaoption.com/texts/<id>.md. This file's connections are below, then his passages.

## Where this source sits

- Source: document (PDF), undated, https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf. Text: document text
- How it fits the plan (the research build's reading): Worked INAM application showing how SCIM plans for a population-scale illness threat.
- Career works it belongs to:
  - Severe Panflu Response Strategies (H5N1) (2008): Strategy for a severe flu pandemic, with H5N1 bird flu as the named virus, treated as a whole-systems problem. (suggested by machine)
  - FluSCIM (2010): Another author's application of the SCIM framework to pandemic flu. (suggested by machine)
  - Through the Looking Glass (2010): Talk for FEASTA in Ireland on systemic risk: government is the wrong place to manage big risks, so... (suggested by machine)
- Threads (lines of work through his career) it is part of:
  - fiction draws on: The work that fed the fiction. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - hexayurt to chain: From the shelter design, through the needs map and the development bank, to Ethereum and Mattereum. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - nuclear / panflu: Pandemic, evacuation and rehousing plans. (through a work suggested by machine)
- Topics: pandemic / influenza / severe (61%); pandemic / severe / scim (34%)
- Distinctive terms here, against the whole archive: SCIM (64 here; 19 sources in all, earliest dated 2009, 9 undated); H5N1 (31 here; 13 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 6 undated); OODA (34 here; 16 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 7 undated); OODA loop (21 here; 9 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 3 undated); masks (21 here; 20 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 2 undated); vaccines (21 here; 21 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 4 undated); INAM (3 here; 2 sources in all, earliest dated none, 2 undated); interdependencies (6 here; 12 sources in all, earliest dated 2009, 3 undated); communications (20 here; 81 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 5 undated); Akvo (5 here; 11 sources in all, earliest dated 2008, 3 undated)
- Importance: core-text score 0.27 (1.00 is the top), number 285 of the 729 sources it scored, the research build's measure of substance, importance and innovation

## Reading it

Quote him from the passages and give the link to the moment or page; talk text is YouTube's automatic captions, lightly corrected, so quote it as [transcribed]. Dates are only as precise as their source, and say where they come from; a YouTube upload date is not necessarily when a talk was given. Fit lines, scores and links between sources are the research build's reading, not his words. Do not invent dates, quotes or sources. Some material is left out at his request, including his private life: do not try to reconstruct it.

Cite as: FluSCIM-69p-English, document, undated, https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf; in Vinay Gupta's archive at guptaoption.com, source [174], https://guptaoption.com/texts/174.md.

## Passages, part 3 of 6
[p. 25 to 26](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=25) globally during a severe pandemic may qualify, within the category of complex problems, as “wicked”31. Existing plans may be of some use against a severe pandemic, insofar as they involve the creation of a catalog of resources, the creation or activation of networks of experts in infrastructure, and the provision of resources of all kinds (among others, staff, communications and transportation) that would be useful during a severe pandemic. When the next pandemic happens, all those plans, protocols and networks (more or less current and active) will remain available as yet another resource. However, whatever the degree of preparation reached, a severe pandemic may require going beyond these elements, and engaging in “empowered improvisation” using resources that are available or can be adapted to needs in real time. 2.d) Recovery WHO has raised the need to plan for recovery both between waves and at the end of the pandemic. This recovery would require assessing damages and restoring lost functionalities. The most effective preparation for recovery is, of course, being able to withstand, as effectively as possible, the impact of the pandemic. Recovery can be understood to occur in two stages. The first stage would involve completely restoring vital services (see SCIM). The second would focus on completely restoring all services (critical or not) available before the pandemic or, in countries and regions where these services were not functioning at a desirable level, to improve services to reach an appropriate level of development. 3. Looking ahead 3.a) The issue of motivation Begun in 2005, preparations for a severe influenza pandemic have slowed down after the 2009-10 pandemic, for several reasons. As the 2009 pandemic emerged, efforts were refocused on the pandemic actually unfolding rather than a hypothetical severe pandemic that might come to be. And despite the deaths that the 2009 pandemic incurred and the problems it caused, the very fact that the pandemic turned out to be classified as “mild” had a certain demotivating effect. Finally, the economic situation that currently affects most countries, directly or indirectly, has diverted a measure of attention and resources from pandemic preparations. Moreover, even before 2009, varying degrees of involvement of countries and, within countries, of different agents – local authorities, businesses, and society as a whole – reflected uneven motivation to 31 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem 20 III.CURRENT PREPAREDNESS SITUATION prepare for a threat characterized by uncertainties, however disruptive that threat might turn out to be. A severe pandemic poses a particular preparedness challenge for several reasons: • Its probability is difficult to assess, and thus lacks the urgency that motivates the focus of energy, attention, time and budgets. • Its timing is unpredictable (unlike, for example, the 2000 effect on computer systems). • Its impact would, moreover, be complex and difficult to visualize. 3.b) Ongoing activities Despite said factors, preparation activities have continued after 2009-10, with response assessment conducted in 2009-1032, advances in vaccines, and initiatives to increase the participation, not just of the healthcare sector, but also of civil protection, essential services, and the

[p. 26 to 27](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=26) example, the 2000 effect on computer systems). • Its impact would, moreover, be complex and difficult to visualize. 3.b) Ongoing activities Despite said factors, preparation activities have continued after 2009-10, with response assessment conducted in 2009-1032, advances in vaccines, and initiatives to increase the participation, not just of the healthcare sector, but also of civil protection, essential services, and the whole of society33. That said, and even though the specific plans and the professional networks mentioned earlier are unquestionably useful, it also seems clear that it would be desirable to have models to facilitate cooperation against complex threats such as a severe influenza pandemic. These models would also be useful against other global systemic threats, such as protracted conflicts, disruptions in supplies, large climatic catastrophes, global economic crises, and others. These models, as we shall see, have been developed precisely to be easy to learn and apply, so as to serve as a “simplified language”, somewhat similar to the codes used to communicate by radio in a storm, so that they might all players to clarify and communicate priorities, assess alternatives, and establish operations in a “noisy” and changing environment. 32 http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/4/11-097972/en/index.html 33 http://towardsasaferworld.org/ 21 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES IV. SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES The following is a proposal. Like plans developed to date, it has not been tested against a severe influenza pandemic. Its potential usefulness might be tested in simulations, in disasters other than a severe influenza pandemic, or in development situations if we consider extreme poverty as a particular type of disaster. The proposal is to use simple models in complex situations. Two specific models are proposed, to be used in combination. We have already shown how a severe pandemic is clearly an example of a complex situation. Its impact would extend over a period of several months to a year or more, with primary consequences (due to numerous cases, serious illness, and deaths), secondary consequences (caused by more or less organized preventive activities in turn driven by a more or less justified fear of infection), and tertiary ones (resulting indirectly from the above, from cascade effects and from self-amplification). The response to this type of situation implies that many agents (governments, businesses, civic networks, individuals) act from their specific domains, at times with actions directed top to bottom, and at other times in decentralized, distributed and autonomous ways: • Examples of top-down response are Public Health recommending early school closure; healthcare experts updating protocols for diagnosis, transport and treatment; or national authorities taking action to deploy human and material resources for which they are responsible. • Examples of decentralized, distributed and autonomous actions include family networks arranging for the care of their young ones; each medical center organising its space, resources and activities, partly in collaboration with neighbourhood citizen organizations; and, at each territorial level, organizations able to provide vital services coordinating with government and, very importantly, among themselves (“side-to-side” coordination), in order to keep said services available. Centralised-distributed actions in a severe pandemic,

[p. 27 to 28](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=27) family networks arranging for the care of their young ones; each medical center organising its space, resources and activities, partly in collaboration with neighbourhood citizen organizations; and, at each territorial level, organizations able to provide vital services coordinating with government and, very importantly, among themselves (“side-to-side” coordination), in order to keep said services available. Centralised-distributed actions in a severe pandemic, as in any other catastrophe, have the advantage of allowing the use of all available capacity throughout the system, effectively coordinating the resources and skills of each agent. On the other hand, a centralised-distributed strategy also raises the known difficulties of coordination: communicating priorities in an uncertain (or “noisy”) environment, establishing guidelines for adaptive response that include agents from different organizations, and smooth operation with different chains of command. These difficulties may be exacerbated when agents face, as would be the case in a severe pandemic, overwhelming demands that may compromise their ability to respond in flexible, rapid, coordinated and adapted ways to each particular situation. There are broad enough precedents for the use of simple models in complex situations, and their usefulness is known. In the field of emergencies, for example, we may recall the Glasgow Coma Scale 34 (designed and published in 1974) which is a simple model, used by emergency personnel around the world, to make decisions that affect the lives of trauma patients, whose conditions can be very complex. The proposal is to use two simple, powerful tools (a checklist and a loop) that, used in combination, can expand the ability to respond flexibly and effectively to complex challenges, using resources that are available or are easy to obtain. 34 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glasgow_Coma_Scale 22 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES The two tools are the Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps (SCIM) and the OODA loop (observation, orientation, decision and action). Both SCIM and the OODA loop are readily remembered and easy to grasp, such that respondents from all levels can learn the basics of the framework and terminology in a short time. Used during the preparation phase, these tools can help identify the weaknesses in our systems that need reinforcement or special attention. Used from the beginning of a crisis and throughout the response phase, they enable responders to act decisively and effectively without the distraction of overly cumbersome and convoluted methodologies. 1. Simple critical infrastructure maps (SCIM) • People in a catastrophe die from six general causes: too cold, too hot, hunger, thirst, disease and injury. • These six causes represent as many “needs”, which are usually met by “systems” whose components are situated on different “levels”. • If normal delivery systems fail, or if we must modify them because it is advantageous to do so, we need to use different strategies: reinforcement, adaptation or replacement. • Groups, organizations and states have needs beyond those that are vital to individuals. Their functioning enables individual survival. The suggested checklist is the Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps (SCIM) model 35, which provides a terminology that can be learned quickly. This terminology is

[p. 28 to 29](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=28) because it is advantageous to do so, we need to use different strategies: reinforcement, adaptation or replacement. • Groups, organizations and states have needs beyond those that are vital to individuals. Their functioning enables individual survival. The suggested checklist is the Simple Critical Infrastructure Maps (SCIM) model 35, which provides a terminology that can be learned quickly. This terminology is used to represent, in an easily understandable way, what keeps individuals alive, in terms of what services are needed to contain the mortality caused by excessive heat or cold, by thirst and hunger, and by disease and injury. These services are modeled after the jurisdictional level of provision, ranging from the individual (“I use clothes to maintain my body temperature”) to the global (“Our fuel is imported through transport networks”). SCIM also models services critical to the functioning of supra-individual entities: • Groups of people, for instance, need communications, transportation, working space, and control of the resources they use. • Each organization, as a special group with a specific purpose, also needs to share a map, a plan and a succession model; and may also have specific needs. • The states, finally, add the need to know their people, and to maintain territory, legal order, effective organizations and international recognition. It should be noted at the outset that when referring to “needs” we do not mean “systems that typically serve these needs”, precisely because it is such systems that may fail in a catastrophic situation. For example, we don't speak of “telephones” but of “communication”, since a certain amount of 35 http://butteredsidedown.co.uk/scim.html http://resiliencemaps.org/files/Dealing_in_Security.July2010.en.pdf 23 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES communication can be done, if necessary, by means other than telephones (walking or using walkie- talkies, satellite telephones, or light signals). While the full SCIM list includes the above 18 items, only a few of them will be “at increased risk” in any given situation. In essence, the use of the model means the 18 items are reviewed for vulnerabilities, and each of those vulnerabilities is resolved using the appropriate reinforcements, complements or substitutions. For the review and resolution process, the OODA loop36 is used, as will be discussed later. Changes in the unfolding situation, reviewed at each new iteration of the loop, are likely to require adjustments in strategy. Looking horizontally from each need to the level(s) at which that need can be addressed, we see, for example, how “hunger” cannot be solved locally in a drought situation that affects local food production; therefore it becomes necessary to import food from the national or international levels. At the organizational level, a hospital’s need to maintain sterile conditions cannot be supported by a “regional power grid” that has failed, so some other strategy, such as “boiling in the building or in the room”, may be used in its place. All such assessments feed into the shared plans, which can be as flexible and adaptive as needed. 1.a) Vital needs of individuals Mortality in a pandemic is due to pandemic influenza itself,

[p. 29 to 30](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=29) by a “regional power grid” that has failed, so some other strategy, such as “boiling in the building or in the room”, may be used in its place. All such assessments feed into the shared plans, which can be as flexible and adaptive as needed. 1.a) Vital needs of individuals Mortality in a pandemic is due to pandemic influenza itself, and also to the disruption of vital systems (health-care and other). Mortality is not the only variable that matters in a pandemic, and physical pain, disability, suffering and worry must be included as well. For a quick assessment, mortality has one advantage: it is comparatively easy to measure, besides being a “proxy” variable for the other variables of interest. However, rather than merely measuring mortality once the situation has finished, it's important that we anticipate it in order to prioritize actions designed to minimize the number of people who die. On the individual level of the SCIM framework, the needs of individuals are reflected as those which correlate with increased risk of dying from failures in vital services. So, in a catastrophic situation, people may find themselves at elevated risk of dying from any of a number of causes: • Excess cold: possible in cold regions, with in situations of extreme weather combined with energy dependence. • Excess heat: possible in hot regions, or extreme climate change, with energy dependence. • Hunger: famine caused by shortages. • Thirst: drought or other causes of water shortage or contamination of potable water. • Disease: influenza and other diseases, normally more or less “contained” by the activities of public health and health care, may increase because of the systemic and health-care disruption. • “Injury”: accidents or violence. 36 John Boyd, 1976. http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence4.htm 24 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES The relative risk of dying from each cause can be reflected in a single chart: • Ideally, we observe only the mortality due to advanced age (which would fall under “disease” as it is due to internal causes), and in the rest of the sectors the risk would be minimal. • In a pandemic without disruption, mortality from “disease” would be increased by influenza alone. • In a pandemic with disruption, deaths from non influenza causes would have to be added. Fig 6. Core SCIM model: Individual – the six causes of death in a catastrophe. The number of deaths resulting from each of the above causes is “contained” by vital services. In the case of excessive heat and cold, this service is provided by shelter: housing (including heating, cooling and insulation) and clothing. Hunger and thirst are solved by supplies. The risk of dying from disease and injury is reduced by the security provided by public health prevention activities, health care, police and army. 1.b) Levels of provision The next step in applying the SCIM model to the local situation is to map at what levels elements of “infrastructure” exist that meet each of the requirements. What entities own, use, manage and maintain resources

[p. 30 to 31](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=30) from disease and injury is reduced by the security provided by public health prevention activities, health care, police and army. 1.b) Levels of provision The next step in applying the SCIM model to the local situation is to map at what levels elements of “infrastructure” exist that meet each of the requirements. What entities own, use, manage and maintain resources that meet each critical need? The first level is that of the individual, followed by the household, neighborhood, city, region, country, and the international level. These levels serve only as a guide. In archipelagos the island level must be included. For example, on the individual level, each person can make decisions to control their own body temperature if they have the right resources, changing the amount of clothing they wear and devising other strategies to keep warm enough or cool enough. In many regions of the world, most of the food arrives from the global level through markets, transport networks and retail; only a fraction comes from the national and regional level; and rarely is that food grown at the household or individual levels. (Local production, when specialized, is largely for exports, delivering to external markets at different times of year.) Items such as cooking and refrigeration need to be included. All 18 items are similarly reviewed, as we will see later. 25 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES Fig 7. Levels and delivery systems of the six basic needs of individuals. 1.c) Provision alternatives The SCIM model focuses attention on needs, which are generally provided by systems that work well before the crisis. Such systems may not be substantially affected by a pandemic in a given territory. For example, excessive heat and excessive cold may not be a problem in areas where temperatures are mild, even during the most severe pandemic. In places where it rains often, thirst will most likely not be a problem. On the other hand, a number of systems at each location may be “disrupted”: they may have stopped providing needed services, they may be at risk of doing so, or the way they work may need to be changed as part of the full set of prevention and treatment strategies. If the specific needs served by the altered system are indeed “vital” (for individuals, groups or organizations) then they will persist regardless of the system’s status. Different strategies may be used to maintain vital services: • Reduce the need (“saving” strategy). For example, use less water (or none) for certain uses, redesign systems so that some steps and ingredients are not needed, or reorganize or delegate tasks so the need for communication is reduced. • Accumulate resources (“stock up” strategy). Between 2005 and 2009, many countries stocked up on antivirals and other resources. Following the 2009-10 pandemic, with many countries suffering an economic crisis, this strategy is not among the first to be considered for a threat that is not generally perceived as a priority. It goes against the motivation of convenience on the side

[p. 31 to 32](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=31) Accumulate resources (“stock up” strategy). Between 2005 and 2009, many countries stocked up on antivirals and other resources. Following the 2009-10 pandemic, with many countries suffering an economic crisis, this strategy is not among the first to be considered for a threat that is not generally perceived as a priority. It goes against the motivation of convenience on the side of customers (getting products that are delivered just when they are needed, through globalized, instantaneously responsive supply networks), and also against the competitive motivations of suppliers (reduced inventories for less storage and greater flexibility)37. 37 http://www.colvet.es/modules.php?name=articulos&idwebstructure=195&idarticulo=55 Revista de Información Veterinaria, Sep 1st 2007. “A strategic food reserve for the Canaries” (in Spanish). Miguel Ángel González Cortés and Juan Manuel Santana Rodríguez. 26 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES • Strengthen the system. For example, exceptional health resources can be assigned to treat influenza patients, or the transport of food can be protected. Unless resources are abundant, this strategy will require prioritizing some systems at the expense of others – delaying certain types of elective surgery until the post-peak period, for example, or even fully abandoning specific noncritical activities. In the case of staff, reinforcement strategies might include employing volunteers, recent retirees, high school seniors or students of related subjects; and providing accelerated training, cross training (so that workers train each other in a variety of basic skills), and telephone support (among experts, either from home or from other workplaces). • Change the level of provision. If a need cannot be met by systems at one level, consider alternate provisioning strategies such as cultivating food locally if imports fail, importing food if local production fails, or using walkie-talkies or satellite phone if communications fail. • Modify the route of delivery. For example, weekly groceries might be delivered to homes rather than fetched by shoppers from the store; liquid fuel for generators might be delivered to substitute, in the case of critical needs, for power normally supplied by the electrical grid; or therapeutic advice for certain diseases might be administered by telephone rather than in person. Fig 8. Mind-map summary of the substitution strategy suggested in the text. Alternatives: centralization / decentralization One area that deserves separate consideration is centralization / decentralization in a crisis. In industrialized countries, the last two centuries have seen the construction of highly efficient systems with a large aggregated cost but with a comparatively low cost per unit. The very complexity of these systems introduces additional risks and vulnerabilities, because each requires accurate and simultaneous operation of several subsystems in order to function. In these systems, use is decoupled from maintenance, allowing the professionalisation of their management and repair, and freeing most people from related tasks, but also creating a dependency which may become visible in a catastrophic situation. The way out of vulnerabilities created by such complexity is usually to seek redundancy in these basic systems. In our homes, we may keep some candles for times when electricity is unavailable. Hospitals have generators adequate to operate the

[p. 32 to 33](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=32) repair, and freeing most people from related tasks, but also creating a dependency which may become visible in a catastrophic situation. The way out of vulnerabilities created by such complexity is usually to seek redundancy in these basic systems. In our homes, we may keep some candles for times when electricity is unavailable. Hospitals have generators adequate to operate the most vital equipment. Emergency personnel might be provided with crank or solar phone chargers. Another possibility is to repurpose existing items. For example, if accommodation might be needed for potentially large numbers of people, standard size panels commonly used in construction may be used to rapidly build simple shelter units at a low cost per person 38, perhaps in the context of a project for population relocation or decompression. Similarly, it is possible to manufacture water filters, stoves and 38 http://www.appropedia.org/Hexayurt 27 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES toilets with resources commonly used for other purposes39. Similar experiences exist with communication systems40. A catalog of solutions adapted to resources already available in each environment serves the same purpose as the accumulation of dedicated material. At a more abstract level, supplying critical needs is about making substitutions. Typically, we respond to our needs using “systems”. If a system fails, or, for lack of the supplies needed for their continued operation, a limited-use regime is entered, it is possible to use a two-step strategy: • First, list the specific services provided by that system. • Second, look for alternative ways to obtain such services. 1.d) Needs of groups The SCIM model goes beyond the “six ways to die” for individuals, and considers three levels of aggregation: groups, organizations and states, each of which can have their operations disrupted to the point of “death” (if they disintegrate or are otherwise unable to provide their services) because their “vital” needs are not covered. Groups, defined as “any collection of people”, may be as few as two people. Typical groups include families, peers on a trip, or any social group. Each individual is part of a number of groups or can bind to them flexibly. Most groups need: • Communications (especially important for dealing with non protocolised situations) • Transportation (available means of transportation, including walking) • Space to meet and conduct business (such as the household for the family, a local cafe for a group of friends, and so on) • Shared use of resources owned by the group (offices, telephones, vehicles and other shared items such as stoves and information) 1.e) The role of groups in a crisis In a severe crisis, family groups and groups of people linked by activities enjoyed in common may be of particular importance. It is in these groups, defined by informal but very powerful links, where individual knowledge about the crisis and response options is articulated. • It will be families, neighbors and friends, for example, who can work out the thorny logistics of arranging child care if public health entities suggest that students should stay at home

[p. 33 to 34](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=33) may be of particular importance. It is in these groups, defined by informal but very powerful links, where individual knowledge about the crisis and response options is articulated. • It will be families, neighbors and friends, for example, who can work out the thorny logistics of arranging child care if public health entities suggest that students should stay at home for a period of time. • Neighborhood associations may in certain circumstances provide support for people who live alone, perhaps checking on them daily, monitoring their health status, and providing or seeking help on their behalf if necessary. 39 http://www.appropedia.org y http://www.akvo.org (akvopedia) 40 http://www.wndw.net 28 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES • More specialized groups such as amateur radio networks, craft clubs or groups of technologists in schools have the capacity to contribute to alternatives to some conventional services. Therefore, the other levels can and should support this capacity to respond to crises by collecting and disseminating information and strategies that may be useful for groups. More specifically, documents offering guidance for home treatment of less severe cases can be outlined and disseminated, along with documents to facilitate families’ and local groups’ taking part in caring for a numerically significant fraction of health-care overload in a severe pandemic. The same applies to the management of certain chronic diseases and disabilities. In turn, each group can make their own map of basic needs, articulate alternatives in case conventional systems fail, and see how they may contribute to the solution of common problems. 1.f) Needs of organizations Organizations are a special kind of group with a purpose that goes beyond the combined purposes of members. Hospitals, police forces, armies and schools are all examples of organizations. An effective organization has all the needs that groups (and therefore also all individuals) have, so they must review those needs to extent that they are applicable. In addition, organizations need three elements of what might be called “social infrastructure”, which give the organization coordination and unity of purpose, and thus allow the organization to function (“to live”) as such: • The “shared map” includes shared reality, such as what is happening, what must be done, what works and what is the correct way of doing things. During a complex catastrophe, every organization and the groups that are part of it need to know about new situations as they unfold, in order to respond by reformulating their objectives. • The “shared plan” includes the activities undertaken by the various groups and individuals within the organization, often in collaboration with other groups and individuals. If the organisation's aims are reformulated, then new action plans will need to be drawn. It may be appropriate to allow peripheral units extra autonomy to redo the plans according to local situations, so that the center will not be overloaded to the point of becoming non-operational. • The “shared succession model”, under non-pandemic circumstances, unfolds through recruitment or appointment and through sick-days and layoffs. In a pandemic, the availability of those involved

[p. 34 to 35](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=34) be drawn. It may be appropriate to allow peripheral units extra autonomy to redo the plans according to local situations, so that the center will not be overloaded to the point of becoming non-operational. • The “shared succession model”, under non-pandemic circumstances, unfolds through recruitment or appointment and through sick-days and layoffs. In a pandemic, the availability of those involved in leadership, coordination and highly specific tasks may be affected. It is therefore necessary to anticipate who replaces the absentees. In addition, organizations often require specialized housing and equipment to achieve their purpose. It is possible to note these needs together with the 18 generic needs. Thus, a hospital, in order to cover part of the needs of a population in terms of “disease”, has specific needs such as “sterilization”, “pain management” and others, perhaps up to a total of 50-100 items. It is worth keeping in mind that the SCIM model suggests that we look at “needs”, not “systems”. Thus, sterilization, which is usually performed in a hospital with an autoclave connected to the mains power supply may, in case of network failure, be performed by boiling. Lastly, organizations require services from other organizations. For example, a hospital may require energy, communications and police services to be available. 29 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES Each organization has its own culture and its own “vocabulary” emanating from a shared understanding of the organization's goals and methods. However, to the extent that a severe pandemic requires re-prioritizing and remodeling organizational activities, the teams in charge of forging the organization's panoramic vision can use the SCIM-OODA framework to assess conditions and transmit adjusted priorities and strategies to units within the organization so that vital services – for the whole society, for other organizations, etc – are delivered as effectively as possible. 1.g) Needs of states Nation-states are a special form of social organization that provide services to all citizens. They provide a legal system and uphold public order, and maintain lists of their own citizens and control of their own territory. Sometimes states also provide infrastructure services such as a national grid, ports and airports. The nation-state carries out its mission through specific organizations such as the police, army and judicial systems, which allow the state to sustain itself and provide services to citizens. For example, the “list of citizens” is maintained at the national level with support of local entities, and territorial control is established through national sovereignty and local services such as land registries. Legal rules that constitute the jurisdiction are developed and implemented nationally, although there are elements which are developed and implemented locally. So, what has been said about organizations is entirely applicable to these structures. 2. OODA loop Designed by Colonel John Boyd to improve the effectiveness of fighter pilots, the OODA loop involves four steps: look at what is happening (Observation); interpret the situation, imagining several likely or extreme scenarios and envisioning our choices (Orientation); determine what to do (Decision), and take the measures decided upon

[p. 35 to 36](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=35) about organizations is entirely applicable to these structures. 2. OODA loop Designed by Colonel John Boyd to improve the effectiveness of fighter pilots, the OODA loop involves four steps: look at what is happening (Observation); interpret the situation, imagining several likely or extreme scenarios and envisioning our choices (Orientation); determine what to do (Decision), and take the measures decided upon (Action). Following Action, Observation begins all over again. Updated proactively and continuously, the OODA loop uses realistic threat models to anticipate how a threatening situation is likely to develop and helps us generate agile and appropriate responses. Fig 9. Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action loop, John Boyd. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_Loop. The OODA loop items, in a crisis, are specified as follows. 30 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES 2.a) Observation In the case of an influenza pandemic, observation encompasses information about the virus, the behavior of the epidemic locally and elsewhere, the local and global response, and indicators of resilience and dependence. Information may be fast, accurate and confirmed, but it can also be useful if it is the best possible estimate, obtained in time, and presented in an understandable way so that it is useful to make effective decisions. In a novel and uncertain situation, we can use lists of questions, derived from our priorities and targeting both known facts (“the new virus exhibits such and such behavior”) and unknown facts (“we do not know how it will progress in the future”). As an example, see the list drawn from the point of view of public health by the European Center for Disease Control (ECDC)41. The questions needed from the point of view of civil protection and the provision of essential services emerge, as we shall see, from implementing the SCIM framework. As examples, a known fact would be “we have so many cubic meters of drinking water for so many people”, and an unknown one would be “we do not know if there may be a shortage, or its possible duration”. To answer our questions, we will use the information from external and internal news, rumors (which we must try to validate or contrast) and information systems (pre-existing or adapted to the crisis). It will be possible to use – preferably with previous tests – communication systems developed for other emergencies in recent years, based on electronic collaboration tools: wikis42, etherpad43, social networks (Twitter, Facebook and others), telephone networks adapted to catastrophic situations (frontlineSMS44) and collaborative maps (HealthMap, ushahidi45). 2.b) Orientation The Orientation element of the loop is about assigning meaning to what is observed, and about answering questions about what is happening, what will happen, and what we can do. Therefore it includes having a threat model (in the case of severe pandemics, the first chapters of this document), which will be useful for the development of alternative predictive models (“how many new patients we may need to treat next week, or the week after that”46). We will also need a model of available resources, so that

[p. 36 to 37](https://resiliencemaps.org/files/fluscim/FluSCIM-69p-English.pdf#page=36) we can do. Therefore it includes having a threat model (in the case of severe pandemics, the first chapters of this document), which will be useful for the development of alternative predictive models (“how many new patients we may need to treat next week, or the week after that”46). We will also need a model of available resources, so that we may consider different possibilities for action (“start a specialised hospital or not”). Orientation is the most critical activity and sits at the center of the model, closely related to the other components. Thus, our “map of the situation” will show the areas of uncertainty which we should Observe more carefully and will indicate which Decisions must be made and how we might Act. The SCIM framework is a useful tool specifically for the Orientation phase, which is a speculative 41 http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/documents/0905_pandemic_influenza_known_facts_and_known_unknowns.pdf 42 Http://www.crisiscamp.org 43 Http://www.etherpad.org 44 http://www.frontlinesms.org 45 http://www.ushahidi.com 46 See numeric simulation annexe. 31 IV.SIMPLE MODELS FOR COMPLEX CRISES non-routine activity, difficult to do in a complex crisis, at a time when there is need to prioritize and re- prioritize appropriately and in a timely fashion. 2.c) Decision Decision, in turn, refers to selecting, at the different action levels, alternatives designed to strengthen, adapt and replace pre-existing systems in order to provide essential services for the duration of the crisis. These alternatives, as is clear from the SCIM framework, may benefit from a shared model of what the essential needs are and what levels can be positioned to address these. Once generated, these alternatives may be weighted according to their feasibility, benefits, difficulties and consequences in order to enable planners to make appropriate decisions at any given time. 2.d) Action Actions – preferably reversible – will be taken at all levels. The primary mission of some levels will be to facilitate, or in some cases limit, the actions of others. Levels include: • For example, at the individual level, strategies such as hand washing or actions regarding the consumption or production of resources can be encouraged. • At the group level, a family or a neighborhood association may organize the care of those who are school-aged. • At the town and island level, planners might procure a supply of insulin for insulin-dependent population, or train the levels they are responsible for in the strategies mentioned in this document. • At the national and regional levels, entities organize services in their areas of responsibility, such as networks of hospitals and laboratories, general performance criteria, and others. • On the international level, governments negotiate to deal with actions such as the production of vaccines and transnational distribution of vital supplies. 3. Using SCIM and OODA The SCIM list of needs and the OODA loop may be used before or during the pandemic, and at any level, from individuals, families or social networks to the national or even international levels. 3.a) Inter-pandemic and pandemic phases: preparedness and response The OODA loop and the SCIM framework can be used before a pandemic,

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Continues in https://guptaoption.com/texts/174-4.md (part 4 of 6).
End of [174] FluSCIM-69p-English, part 3 of 6. Its connections are at the top of this file; the map is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt.