# The Global Cyber Game: Achieving strategic resilience in the global knowledge society (part 9 of 10)

> One source from the archive of Vinay Gupta's work at guptaoption.com, as plain text for AI agents: [143], part 9 of 10. Vinay Gupta, exponential humanitarian. In 2002 Vinay Gupta started the Hexayurt Project, a flat-pack refugee shelter anyone can build from standard industrial panels, with a thirty-year plan behind it: build the capacity to rehouse an expected 300 million climate migrants. Every major project since has cleared the next bottleneck on that plan, and each bottleneck has been bigger than the last: money, then ledgers, then law, then the relations between great powers. Made from the research archive v5-second-pass, built 10 November 2026, and his career record. The map of the whole archive is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt, and any source [id] is at https://guptaoption.com/texts/<id>.md. This file's connections are below, then his passages.

## Where this source sits

- Source: document (PDF), 2013-05-08 (from the career record), https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf. Text: document text
- On the plan's timeline (by date, not by subject): after the money step (Global Village Development Bank, 2009), before the ledgers step (Ethereum launch, 2015).
- How it fits the plan (the research build's reading): Defence-tier report citing his cyber views; tangential to the build.
- Career works it belongs to:
  - The Global Cyber Game: Achieving strategic resilience in the global knowledge society (2013): Hardin Tibbs's 2013 report of the UK Defence Academy Cyber Inquiry for the Ministry of Defence, which...
  - Blind in the Panopticon: The decreasing marginal utility of access to information as an aspect of cyber policy (2012): Cyber policy essay: past a point, more surveillance data has negative value, because a state can collect... (suggested by machine)
  - Multipolar Realpolitik (2024): Essays arguing that a global truce among a few great powers, with treaties checked by AI, blockchains and... (suggested by machine)
- Threads (lines of work through his career) it is part of:
  - cyber and defense: Security work for defense clients, built on one idea: set rivals to check each other. Resilience and Opportunity in...
  - CheapID to Mattereum: One identity pattern, from a person's ID card in 2006 to warranties on physical goods in 2017. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - nuclear / panflu: Pandemic, evacuation and rehousing plans. (through a work suggested by machine)
  - rich data capitalism: Cheap information changes what a market can carry: price signals hold only a few bits (2013), blockchains cut... (through a work suggested by machine)
- Topics: The Global Cyber Game (94%)
- Distinctive terms here, against the whole archive: cyber (660 here; 32 sources in all, earliest dated 2009); Wired (35 here; 22 sources in all, earliest dated 2002, 1 undated); Hardin Tibbs (8 here; 3 sources in all, earliest dated 2011); DARPA (7 here; 3 sources in all, earliest dated 2013); jobs (28 here; 85 sources in all, earliest dated 2003, 4 undated); communications (26 here; 81 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 5 undated); DNS (10 here; 23 sources in all, earliest dated 2006); Barlow (5 here; 7 sources in all, earliest dated 2013); ICANN (3 here; 2 sources in all, earliest dated 2011); realpolitik (5 here; 11 sources in all, earliest dated 2006, 2 undated)
- The earliest dated source in this archive for (undated sources may be earlier): peer-to-peer; Barlow; John Perry Barlow; economic zone; Forbes; Westphalia; real-world assets; DARPA; global commons
- Importance: core-text score 0.19 (1.00 is the top), number 371 of the 729 sources it scored, the research build's measure of substance, importance and innovation
- Related sources:
  - [243] [Multipolar Realpolitik (Omnibus draft) (2024)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/243.md): close in content (cosine 0.92)
  - [851] [Global governance in the era of blockchain. (2018)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/851.md): close in content (cosine 0.89)
- On the same works, just before: [400] [http://hub.coe.int/forum-mondial-de-la-democratie-5-11-oc... (2012)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/400.md); [399] [Council of Europe World Forum for Democracy... (2012)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/399.md); [395] Open Data Ireland 25 October inaugeral meeting (2012)
- On the same works, just after: [319] [A sleepless night trying to find words (2013)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/319.md); [115] [Warlords, Inc.: Black Markets, Broken States, and the... (2015)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/115.md); [286] [Ouishare on global democracy and the real sharing economy (2016)](https://guptaoption.com/texts/286.md)

## Reading it

Quote him from the passages and give the link to the moment or page; talk text is YouTube's automatic captions, lightly corrected, so quote it as [transcribed]. Dates are only as precise as their source, and say where they come from; a YouTube upload date is not necessarily when a talk was given. Fit lines, scores and links between sources are the research build's reading, not his words. Do not invent dates, quotes or sources. Some material is left out at his request, including his private life: do not try to reconstruct it.

Cite as: The Global Cyber Game: Achieving strategic resilience in the global knowledge society, document, 2013-05-08, https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf; in Vinay Gupta's archive at guptaoption.com, source [143], https://guptaoption.com/texts/143.md.

## Passages, part 9 of 10
[p. 101 to 103](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=101) difficult to assert in a global telecommunications marketplace. The only way round this dilemma in the longer term 175 http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/publications/public/ah12/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_surveilla nce_report.pdf accessed 14/02/13 176 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 177 Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? (Cambridge (USA): The MIT Press, 2011) The Global Cyber Game © 2013 96 www.da.mod.uk is for democratic states to introduce legislation to regulate all Internet interception that is as tough as their domestic protections are now. If the world is moving towards the N-topia scenario, this is a plausible outcome, as in this scenario there is likely to be a UN Right of Information which would mandate such standards internationally. Meanwhile, this issue is likely to pose mounting internal tensions for democratic states. One possible Cyber Game play to defuse this tension would be for democratic states unilaterally to give up Internet surveillance. This would confer very high international cyber legitimacy on any state doing it, but what would be the cost of losing the surveillance? An age-old version of the information dilemma relates to intelligence gathering. Any use of intelligence information risks exposing the source, and shutting off further information. For example, Osama bin Laden stopped using his satellite phone in 1998 after its presumed use to target a cruise missile attack on his training camps, narrowly missing him. 178 This dilemma gives intelligence organizations a distinctly different culture from action oriented defence organizations. It also lies behind controversial proposals for secret courts in the UK, as the government would like to present evidence obtained secretly, and fears that if this evidence is presented in open court it will cause the secret methods or sources to become ineffective or unwilling. 179 To the extent that it applies to digital interception, this calculus frames the Cyber Game too narrowly. It risks undermining trust in the government and creating 178 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122101994.html accessed 14/02/13 179 http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/sep/25/secret-courts-the-essential-guide accessed 14/02/13 The Global Cyber Game © 2013 97 www.da.mod.uk sympathy for the defendants, a point made to Andrew Tyrie MP, chairman of the all-party group on rendition, by two retired US generals who warned that forfeiting values in the face of danger drives ‘undecideds into the arms of the enemy’. 180 The intelligence dilemma also applies to the public at large. State surveillance is most effective for information gathering when there is very little of it. As everyone becomes aware, through news stories, that all their communications are under surveillance, they will simply stop saying anything that is of any interest to law enforcement or espionage agencies. As Internet security expert Dan Kaminsky said after the Petraeus affair, ‘...everything is logged. The reality is if you don’t want something to show up on the front page of The New York Times, then don’t say it.’ 181 If this advice is widely adopted, blanket surveillance will have rendered itself largely useless. Except, that is, as a tool of repression. The clear lesson being, don’t do it if you don’t want to become a repressive state. If the

[p. 103 to 105](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=103) don’t want something to show up on the front page of The New York Times, then don’t say it.’ 181 If this advice is widely adopted, blanket surveillance will have rendered itself largely useless. Except, that is, as a tool of repression. The clear lesson being, don’t do it if you don’t want to become a repressive state. If the choice for democratic states is between a future defensible public Internet and the loss of continued Internet surveillance, the decision should be easy. Domestic surveillance capability is inimical to Internet security, and hence to the enormous economic growth and social development potential that it promises. It is also ultimately self-defeating and contrary to the values of democratic states. 180 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9829914/Secret-court-hearings-will-do-more-harm-than- good-Tory-MP-says.html accessed 14/02/13 181 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/technology/trying-to-keep-your-e-mails-secret-when-the-cia- chief-couldnt.html?pagewanted=all accessed 18/02/13 The Global Cyber Game © 2013 98 www.da.mod.uk A future secure Internet would shift the Cyber Game from a condition where the future of the global knowledge society and economy is at risk from active threats, to one where it is substantially protected and able to flourish. The use of cyberpower by states that involved deception, espionage and sabotage would then focus back on the hard power level of the Cyber Gameboard, with a largely military-on-military focus. If at the same time military NCW systems became secure enough, hard power plays on the Cyber Gameboard would increasingly tend to involve F-space cyber weaponry, as described earlier. However, this is the future world of the N-topia scenario, in which case the level of violent conflict would be continuing to follow its long run downward trend, and hopefully there would be few if any F-space wars. Alternatively if democratic states continue to leave the Internet at risk, with little to gain but surveillance capability of self-cancelling value, the world will be following a path towards the N-crash scenario. In this future, ultimately the only available defensive cyber options for states will be to Balkanize the Internet, thereby undermining a substantial part of humanity’s hope for the future. To a significant degree, the choice between the world of N-topia and N-crash lies in the hands of states and the way they decide to play the Global Cyber Game. For states there are fundamentally two ways of playing. They can play from a Westphalian perspective, as if it is a zero-sum game with absolute winners and losers, which will emphasize adversarial geopolitics. Alternatively they can adopt a post-Westphalian, pro- The Global Cyber Game © 2013 99 www.da.mod.uk knowledge economy perspective, as if it is a non-zero game with an expanding pie for all, which will emphasize global cooperation. The adversarial mode will be the easiest for state players to adopt, as it tends to be their default mode of operation, but it carries much greater risks of absolute loss of global development potential. The cooperative mode has a far greater pay-off socially and economically, but it goes against the grain of traditional geopolitics and will require far-sighted leadership and strong will on the part of state

[p. 105 to 108](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=105) state players to adopt, as it tends to be their default mode of operation, but it carries much greater risks of absolute loss of global development potential. The cooperative mode has a far greater pay-off socially and economically, but it goes against the grain of traditional geopolitics and will require far-sighted leadership and strong will on the part of state actors. Strategic responsibility for national cyber resilience If state actors are to play the Cyber Game with the type of comprehensive strategic perspective being advocated here, they will need to bring responsibility for cyber strategy together into one organizational unit. In many states responsibility for what may be called ‘national cyber resilience’ functions is currently fragmented among several defence, intelligence, policing, economic and social welfare organizations, as it is in the UK. To ensure the state acts as a strategically coherent Cyber Game player, a single coordinating unit with topsight responsibility for cyber strategy needs to be created. At its top level, this unit would align Cyber Game play with national strategy, at its middle level it would set strategy for cyber infrastructure resilience, and at an operational level would it would set strategy for the cyber interdiction functions of law enforcement and the military. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 100 www.da.mod.uk Ideally, such a unit would work to maintain national Cyber Game play in a cooperative rather than an adversarial mode, continually looking for opportunities to maximize integrative power at the top level of the Cyber Gameboard. It would be very conscious of the dangers of adopting an adversarial mode of play, one that would view the gameboard merely as an arena for potential conflict and seeing only threats arising at the hard power level. By keeping the wider strategic perspective of the whole gameboard in view, it would particularly try to avoid hard power interdiction moves against genuine social power players. At the highest level of thinking, such a unit would see its ultimate global responsibility as being to keep the global knowledge commons intact, to encourage all possible steps to increase the overall defensibility of the Internet, and to resist any tendency towards Balkanization of the public Internet. The overall stance being recommended here amounts to strategic stewardship of the Global Cyber Game, aiming to sustain both national quality of life and the development and defence of a global knowledge society. The next section offers a summary set of recommendations for playing the Cyber Game that correspond with this outlook which, if adopted by a majority of states, should ensure the world enjoys a prosperous future cyber peace. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 101 www.da.mod.uk The Global Cyber Game © 2013 102 www.da.mod.uk National strategy strategy National rsilience infrastructure National strategy International Intelligence unit cpability infrastructure Adversarial interdiction stray National cyber resilience Recommendations: How to play the Cyber Game The following summary recommendations for playing the Global Cyber Game correspond with the strategic objective of maximum global advantage described above. They are written with state

[p. 107 to 109](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=107) The Global Cyber Game © 2013 102 www.da.mod.uk National strategy strategy National rsilience infrastructure National strategy International Intelligence unit cpability infrastructure Adversarial interdiction stray National cyber resilience Recommendations: How to play the Cyber Game The following summary recommendations for playing the Global Cyber Game correspond with the strategic objective of maximum global advantage described above. They are written with state players particularly in mind, but most apply equally for all players, if only as a matter of enlightened self-interest. Take the Global Cyber Game seriously Everyone who uses a networked computer is part of the Cyber Game, and the game is getting potentially dangerous. Most players, individuals and organizations, are unprepared for the severity and speed of possible future developments. Use a comprehensive gameboard Map your understanding of the Global Cyber Game onto a fully comprehensive cyber power framework that can incorporate the social, economic and military aspects of power, plus the technological, social and psychological/cognitive aspects of information. This report proposes a framework, the Cyber Gameboard, that has these characteristics. Think in terms of the whole gameboard When making policy and strategy, include the whole gameboard in your thinking, don’t inadvertently see the game only from the perspective of one part of the board. Policy and strategy should be holistic with respect to all dimensions of the gameboard. Bring everyone onto the gameboard All players, and government players particularly, should encourage other players to see the Cyber Game in comprehensive terms, that is to use the same Cyber Gameboard. This will create a shared cyber taxonomy and language, help ensure against strategic misjudgments, and make it easier to identify common ground. Keep to the high ground Hold in mind that the global knowledge commons is a shared human heritage and that it needs to be enhanced and protected. Defending the present and future information value it represents is an implicit responsibility of national cyber strategy. No tactical Cyber Game plays should violate this principle. Faites vos jeux: open or closed cyber play? The central ideological decision of the Cyber Game is whether to play as if freedom of information content is a public good in itself, or whether extensive control of information content is necessary for public safety. The Western democratic wisdom, and the basis of open society, is that freedom of content ultimately wins out because it creates more public value. This is the acid test: will Western democracies stay true to that principle as the Cyber Game unfolds? Assume transparency During the present ‘Rising Alarm’ scenario period, information transparency is likely to be a persistent reality. All strategy and policy should be made as if it will become public The Global Cyber Game © 2013 103 www.da.mod.uk knowledge. As long as policy and strategy have been formulated from the big picture perspective of the whole board, it should have high legitimacy when seen in public. Don’t proliferate gameboard risk The transparency principle also applies to military malware, and indeed to all malware, which should be built as

[p. 108 to 109](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=108) become public The Global Cyber Game © 2013 103 www.da.mod.uk knowledge. As long as policy and strategy have been formulated from the big picture perspective of the whole board, it should have high legitimacy when seen in public. Don’t proliferate gameboard risk The transparency principle also applies to military malware, and indeed to all malware, which should be built as if it will escape into the wild and proliferate, and the design should guarantee it will be harmless when this happens. Governments shouldn’t develop cyber weapons or encourage malware markets that will increase risk for all players through proliferation. No players should develop malware that directly or indirectly impairs or endangers the functioning of the entire information infrastructure (the ‘high ground’ principle). Be aware Moore’s Law is gaining over Clausewitz The informationalization of weapons is reducing the size and increasing the precision of the bang for the buck. Weapons of all types, in C-space and F-space, are tending towards remote individualized destruction or disablement of hardware, software, information, persons, and minds. This is the shape of total information war. There is no distant frontline. All nodes are potential targets. Who is now fighting who and why? Don’t rely on pre-emptive attack An openly held doctrine of pre-emptive attack, for example as advanced by President Bush after 9/11, has multiple weaknesses. It requires unattainably reliable intelligence; it leaves decision-makers susceptible to disinformation from interested parties; and it encourages all who fear they may be targets to use extreme secrecy, and to use rather than hold weapons. 182 For all these reasons it is a destabilizing and inadvisable move in the Cyber Game. An unconditional ‘no first strike’ doctrine, as declared by China and India in relation to nuclear weapons, is preferable because it increases stability though the use of integrative power. Develop non-provocative defence When destructive power is used for deterrence it leads to inherently unstable arms races. 183 Cyber deterrence will simply have this effect faster, because the Cyber Game runs at a higher clock rate than industrial-era geopolitics. The challenge in cyber deterrence, while acknowledging problematic issues such as attribution, is to rediscover the principle of ‘non- provocative defence’ developed in Europe in the late stages of the Cold War. 184 The key question for cyber strategists and technologists is: how can cyber defence and deterrence be designed in a way that it demonstrably poses no threat of pre-emptive attack? Avoid excessive secrecy Cyber Game players need to be fast and flexibly networked. Governments do have some things that legitimately need to be secret, but the current extent of secrecy is an impediment to playing the Cyber Game effectively, just as it was in the much slower-paced Cold War. 185 182 Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy (London: Profile Books, 2011) 183 Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications Inc.,1989) 184 Geoffrey Wiseman, Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence (New York: PALGRAVE, 2002) 185 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) The Global Cyber

[p. 109 to 111](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=109) just as it was in the much slower-paced Cold War. 185 182 Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy (London: Profile Books, 2011) 183 Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications Inc.,1989) 184 Geoffrey Wiseman, Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence (New York: PALGRAVE, 2002) 185 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) The Global Cyber Game © 2013 104 www.da.mod.uk Apply the legitimacy test Legitimacy is the ultimate currency of cyberpower in the Cyber Game. A general rule of legitimacy can be applied on the Cyber Gameboard: the closer a cyber gameplay is to cells 7, 8 & 9, the more legitimacy it will have. In other words, don’t take down a social power player using coercive power if you want to preserve legitimacy. Keep resolving the information dilemma The information dilemma—information wants to be public, information wants to be private – will keep manifesting in many guises in the Cyber Game, and it must consistently be resolved in a way that avoids becoming locked into one of the extremes of the dilemma. Assess information value Develop the discipline of assessing information value, to gauge whether any given cyber move will increase it or destroy it in any gameboard cell. To paraphrase President Clinton, it’s the information, stupid! Go post-Westphalian, but be kind to the Westphaliosaurs Recognize that the information revolution is transcending many Westphalian assumptions, and find ways to make the transition without losing coherence. Play the Cyber Game as a post-Westphalian, but remember that not everyone has got there yet. Reset internal boundaries The boundary between domestic and international affairs, the key demarcation line for Westphalian states, has no intrinsic existence in C-space, and is far more ambiguous in a post- Westphalian world. This means that national cyber security functions need to be organized so that the domestic-international distinction is not an obstruction. States typically treat citizens and foreigners differently in terms of information rights. Recognizing that full human rights will eventually be granted to everyone in a post-Westphalian world, and in the N-topia scenario, the ‘high ground’ resolution is for each country to grant everyone whichever set of local information rights gives the greatest protection, either those of citizens or foreigners. Create a cyber strategy unit In many countries, responsibility for national cyber resilience functions is currently fragmented among several defence, intelligence, policing and other organizations. To make a nation a coherent Cyber Game player, a single coordinating unit with topsight responsibility for cyber strategy should be created. Distinguish C-space and F-space National cyber security operational responsibilities should be divided between C-space and F-space. C-space operations should be allocated to the intelligence community. F-space operations should be allocated to the military. This move anticipates two future developments: that the centre of gravity of all military operations will move into F-space; and the (scenario-dependent) re-architecting and hardening of C-space. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 105 www.da.mod.uk Protect F-space and geographic space National defence is traditionally concerned with defending the geographic territory of

[p. 110 to 112](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=110) community. F-space operations should be allocated to the military. This move anticipates two future developments: that the centre of gravity of all military operations will move into F-space; and the (scenario-dependent) re-architecting and hardening of C-space. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 105 www.da.mod.uk Protect F-space and geographic space National defence is traditionally concerned with defending the geographic territory of the nation. But national economic dependence on F-space is global in extent. National defence therefore needs to extend into F-space globally, but this move should be framed strategically in terms of mutually protecting the global F-space commons, because from a Westphalian perspective it is otherwise likely to appear threatening. Let robots play by cyber rules The rapidly expanding deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous F-space (robotic) weapons and platforms presents a fresh challenge for defence doctrine. The conceptual development of C-space and F-space as parallel modes of cyber operation allows robotic weapons to be treated as part of the Cyber Game. F-space weapons are Cyber Game players too. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 106 www.da.mod.uk Conclusion When the Internet first appeared, the cultural bias of Western countries was to see it as a wonderful and welcome innovation. The fact that it created security problems somewhat took them by surprise and they have been reluctant to respond. In contrast, states such as Russia and China saw the Internet as a potential threat from the outset, and looked at the problem in the round from their perspective. They formulated strategy and began to move pre-emptively, which has allowed them to take the initiative and to some extent define the Cyber Game. As a result, cyberspace is now justifiably seen by Western countries as a new and potentially serious avenue of international attack, which must logically be militarized to protect the nation. Treating cyberspace as a new military domain or environment is a pragmatic and robust response to a new type of threat, but what if it inadvertently exposes us to more risk than it removes? What if, perversely, information operates counter-intuitively in the military arena like the shock wave in early supersonic flight, which unexpectedly reversed the effect of familiar aircraft control surfaces with initially disastrous results? Cyber realpolitik starts with the usual military logic of peacetime, that is, by preparing for potential threats. The problem is that this causes escalatory pressure at the best of times, let alone in a technologically hyper-charged context. The realpolitik of cyberpower makes what seem reasonable underlying assumptions. Is it not realistic to take geopolitical conflict as an inevitable part of the human condition, and to see cyberpower as a new capability tossed into an age-old mix? But what if information abundance is so deeply transformative that it is changing not only the old game between nations but the global gameboard itself? In this case, we need a different approach, one that seeks to fully appreciate the new game and gameboard before making recommendations for national security. The ability of national governments to understand and tame

[p. 112 to 113](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=112) mix? But what if information abundance is so deeply transformative that it is changing not only the old game between nations but the global gameboard itself? In this case, we need a different approach, one that seeks to fully appreciate the new game and gameboard before making recommendations for national security. The ability of national governments to understand and tame the Global Cyber Game, before it takes on an unwelcome life of its own, may be the crucial test for the effectiveness and even legitimacy of the nation state in the information age. The means of doing this is to establish a set of principles grounded in the root characteristics of information and power. These principles can then form design criteria for the development of cyber policy and strategy. This approach is similar to the current effort to devise international norms for cyber conflict, with the difference that these are primarily based in international law. 186 The approach suggested here starts as close as possible to the root of the challenge, and then uses more triangulating factors to arrive at a more broadly cast set of principles for cyber security. The factors considered should include the range of cultural perspectives, such as the Russian and e.g. Prof. M. Schmidt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: 186 Cambridge University Press, 2013) The Global Cyber Game © 2013 107 www.da.mod.uk Chinese outlooks and the information-based asymmetric approaches they are pursuing, with the hope that the insights generated can anticipate developments and facilitate coalition- building. They would also provide a basis for constructive input to any proposed norms. Principles relating to freedom of expression will not be welcomed by Russia and China, for whom ideas are regarded as threats. On the other hand, what China sees as benign Internet surveillance is regarded as intellectual property theft by Western countries. A clash of values is to be expected as a result of the cultural collision, or possibly convergence, produced by the Internet. If viewed from a static perspective based on a historical assessment of national values, the clash will be seen as inevitable and unavoidable. On the other hand, the global system may be seen as following an evolutionary trajectory. In this case the cultural gap can be seen more in terms of time rather than geography, and as gradually closing, pointing to a way for Western countries to engage, for example, the leading edge of Chinese thinking. Another important principle is that governments should avoid defending the information infrastructure in a way that puts the whole at risk. This principle would mean forgoing some lesser tactical advantages for the sake of the strategic gain of protecting the whole, and making up the difference with alternative tactics. Similarly, it is likely that an online arms race would threaten the integrity of the Internet either directly or indirectly, as described earlier, and a strong case can be made that the Internet itself is simply not robust enough to be a

[p. 113 to 114](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=113) the sake of the strategic gain of protecting the whole, and making up the difference with alternative tactics. Similarly, it is likely that an online arms race would threaten the integrity of the Internet either directly or indirectly, as described earlier, and a strong case can be made that the Internet itself is simply not robust enough to be a medium of war. This cannot be proved definitively, but it is amply indicated by the balance of risks. Protection of the Internet as a whole is therefore probably not compatible with the development of offensive online weapons, which in any case do not provide any absolute advantage. Such a principle would mean that online defence and offence would need to be clearly distinguished. This may take some technical ingenuity, plus longer term design changes. Expressing this principle differently, states may wish to play geopolitical chess or wéiqí, but it does not make sense for them to destroy the gameboard. In short, the period of the Internet ‘Free Lunch’ for state actors is over. It is no longer possible to project hard power through a soft power medium without widespread blowback. The tough message for governments is that they must consciously accept a loss of some cyber options they have enjoyed during the free lunch period, in order to maximize future social and economic value. Acting to make the global information infrastructure as secure as possible will reduce the scope for certain online activities including cyber surveillance and sabotage. This adjustment in priorities will open the way for entirely feasible technical design changes to the Internet that will make it enduringly robust and secure. The information revolution was brought into being by open policies and societies, and expresses their values of open information exchange. But critics of open society in China point out that the social and economic chaos of Western societies means that closure and information control is essential. The open societies themselves falter in their conviction and resolve because they too fear the apparently growing chaos. This is why they have previously allowed terrorism to undermine their dedication to principle, so setting a shaky background for the advent of cyber competition. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 108 www.da.mod.uk Yet the Cyber Game cannot be won without a return to principle and conviction, and the open societies cannot now create a convincing cyber narrative that involves closure and negation of the individual. The closed societies will try to operate without such a narrative, but the more they adopt the networked forms of operation the more this will undermine them. It is through the heart of apparent chaos that the new narrative must be found. Much as in biological systems, a new geo-systemic position must be found close to the boundary between chaos and order, just on the side of order. If this position can be found effectively through the expansion of the global knowledge commons, it will mute the criticisms of the closed societies, who will despite themselves find

[p. 114 to 115](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=114) new narrative must be found. Much as in biological systems, a new geo-systemic position must be found close to the boundary between chaos and order, just on the side of order. If this position can be found effectively through the expansion of the global knowledge commons, it will mute the criticisms of the closed societies, who will despite themselves find it attractive because it will solve what they know are the shortcomings of their own approach, and it will temper the worst excursions into chaos by the open societies. This may ultimately result in discovery of a form of economy and society that will resolve the still relevant ideological standoff between capitalism and socialism, charting a future middle way. We need to identify the high ground in the Cyber Game. We need to be clearer about the central values of the global knowledge commons, and how these relate to Western democratic values. In practice Western governments have not yet discovered how to create a link between their values and the operative principles of the knowledge commons. This accounts for the Western failure to articulate a coherent position on freedom of information content in the struggle over Internet governance. It is vitally important that Western governments acknowledge any failure to live up to their values when it comes to the Cyber Game. They are in danger of giving away the family silver without even realizing it. They must stake out a position that affirms their core values, relates them clearly to the Cyber Game and the knowledge commons, and uses them to orient cyber policy and strategy. This will clarify the differences in their positions vis-à-vis Russia and China, and will help guide constructive diplomacy. George Kennan argued for a similar stance in his ‘Long Telegram’ during the Cold War. ‘We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in [the] past....Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.’ 187 The overarching perspective being advanced here is that, in the information age, the integrity of the Internet as a whole is crucial for international development, prosperity and stability. In any future in which the full potential of the Internet is realized, the protection of the integrity of the entire Internet will also have been internationally recognized as a primary responsibility shared by all governments. In that future, all governments, acting in their own enlightened self-interest, will see the structural and functional integrity of the Internet as a key part of their national strategy. This 187 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm accessed 18/02/13 The Global Cyber Game © 2013 109 www.da.mod.uk will be understood as not only the best way to achieve

[p. 114 to 116](https://files.howtolivewiki.com/cyber/20130508-Cyber_report_final_U.pdf#page=114) a primary responsibility shared by all governments. In that future, all governments, acting in their own enlightened self-interest, will see the structural and functional integrity of the Internet as a key part of their national strategy. This 187 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm accessed 18/02/13 The Global Cyber Game © 2013 109 www.da.mod.uk will be understood as not only the best way to achieve economic prosperity, but also as a general pre-condition for national security. It will also be seen to help ensure international stability and as opening the way to the most promising possible future(s) for the human race as a whole. The Global Cyber Game © 2013 110 www.da.mod.uk Bibliography Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David. In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1997. Arthur, W. Brian. The Nature of Technology. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2009. Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature, A Necessary Unity. New York: Bantam, 1988. Benkler, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles. London: Anchor, 2003. Borkin, Joseph and Welsh, Charles A. Germany’s Master Plan. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943. Boulding, Kenneth E. Three Faces of Power. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications Inc.,1989. Brand, Stewart. The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at MIT. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987. Castells, Manuel. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Clausewitz, Karl von. On War (The Book of War). New York: Random House Inc., 2000. (p.249 onwards) Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 2002. Davis, Stan. Lessons from the Future. Oxford: Capstone Publishing Ltd., 2001. Gaffney, Frank. War Footing. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005. Gibson, James J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. Publishers,1986. Hammersley, Ben. 64 Things You Need to Know Now for Then. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2012. Isaacson, Walter. Steve Jobs. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. Landau, Susan. Surveillance or Security?. Cambridge (USA): The MIT Press, 2011. Liddell, Henry & Scott, Robert. A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), 1940. Lloyd, Seth. Programming the Universe: A Quantum Computer Scientist takes on the Cosmos. London: Vintage, 2007. Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge (USA): Harvard University Press, 2001. Martin, Roger. The Opposable Mind: Winning Through Integrative Thinking. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2009. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Secrecy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. Naughton, John. A Brief History of the Future. London: Phoenix Paperbacks, 2000. Nye, Joseph. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. Perez, Carlota. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2003. Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in our History and its Causes. London: Penguin, 2011. Redman, Thomas. Data Driven: Profiting from your most Important Business Aspect. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2008. The Global Cyber Game © 2013

---
Continues in https://guptaoption.com/texts/143-10.md (part 10 of 10).
End of [143] The Global Cyber Game: Achieving strategic resilience in the global knowledge society, part 9 of 10. Its connections are at the top of this file; the map is https://guptaoption.com/llms.txt.